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Abstract: Vetter (2015) develops a localised theory of modality, based on potentialities of 
actual objects. Two factors play a key role in its appeal: its commitment to Hardcore Actu-
alism, and to Naturalism. Vetter’s commitment to Naturalism is in part manifested in her 
adoption of Aristotelian universals. In this paper, we argue that a puzzle concerning the 
identity of unmanifested potentialities cannot be solved with an Aristotelian conception of 
properties. After introducing the puzzle, we examine Vetter’s attempt at amending the Ar-
istotelian conception in a way that avoids the puzzle, and conclude that this amended ver-
sion is no longer to be considered naturalistic. Potentiality theory cannot be both actualist 
and naturalist. We then argue that, if naturalism is to be abandoned by the actualist, there 
are good reasons to adopt a Platonist conception of universals, for they offer a number of 
theoretical advantages and allow us to avoid some of the problems facing Vetter’s theory. 
Keywords: Platonic Universals, Potentiality, Naturalism, Actualism, Dispositionalism. 
1. Introduction: Vetter’s potentiality-based theory of modality
Vetter’s (2015) potentiality theory of modality is the view that the truth 
and falsity of alethic modal claims – in particular claims about metaphysical 
modality – have their source in the potentialities present in the actual world. 
Potentialities are the (only) truthmakers of modal discourse. According to the 
view, the potentialities of actual concrete objects (past and present) fix all the 
modal facts and determine the topology and extension of the modal space. 
For the purposes of this paper, we can formulate the potentiality theory as 
the conjunction of the following two theses:
PPoss: ‘possibly p’ is true iff and because there is some potentiality whose manifes-
tation, if manifested, would make ‘p’ true. 
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PNec: ‘necessarily p’ is true iff and because there is no potentiality whose manifes-
tation, if manifested, would make ‘not-p’ true.1 
This is a bare-boned version of Vetter’s theory, one which could hardly 
hope to achieve extensional correctness, that is, to generate enough modal 
truths. Vetter ingenuously enhances her account in a number of ways to rem-
edy this, introducing joint potentialities (neither Fischer-Dieskau nor Gerald 
Moore could perform Schubert’s Die Winterreise on their own, but could do 
so together) and extrinsic potentialities (Fischer-Dieskau has the potentiality 
to perform Die Winterreise with Gerald Moore). building on borghini and 
Williams’ concept of a branching disposition (2008: 32), Vetter also develops 
the important notion of iterated potentialities (I do not have the potentiality 
to speak Finnish, but I have the potentiality to learn how to speak Finnish – 
inelegantly, I have the potentiality to have the potentiality to speak Finnish). 
In this paper we will only discuss the minimal version of the theory, but it 
is important to keep in mind that it is because of the development of these 
further aspects (and many others, such as the treatment of gradability and the 
development of a rigorous semantics) that Vetter’s work truly stands out as the 
canonical text on dispositions for many years to come. 
There are three factors that crucially contribute to the appeal of Vetter’s po-
tentiality theory as an overall account of modality, which can be summarised 
under the headings of Realism, Hardcore Actualism, and Naturalism. 
Vetter (2015: 33-60) presents original and persuasive arguments against the 
reduction of dispositions to counterfactual conditionals, based on the gradability 
of dispositions, which reinforce and round out the classic, well-known2 objec-
tions based on finks and antidotes: irreducibly modal properties are part of the 
furniture of this world. We have to be realist about them. A tempting thought 
ensues: since we have to accept these properties into our ontology, we might as 
well make them do as much work as possible – maybe we could even explain the 
whole of modal discourse with them. However, the potentiality theory does not 
aim to be a reductive theory of modality, in the way that, say, Lewis’s (1986) ac-
count is. Rather, it aims at rearranging the landscape: according to the potential-
ity theorist, we should take localised modality3 to be more fundamental than the 
 1 These can be formalised by expressing potentiality with a predicate modifier, pot: ‘♢p’ is true 
iff pot[Φ](xx), where Φxx would make ‘p’ true. 
 2 See Martin (1994) and bird (1998), as well as Manley and Wasserman (2008). 
 3 “A potentiality is localised in the sense that that it is a property of a particular object […] pos-
sibility, on the contrary, is not localised this way. Its being possible that such-and-such is not primarily 
a fact about any one particular object; it is a fact about how things in general might have turned out 
to be” (Vetter 2015: 2). In linguistic terms, the difference can be expressed by the fact that “the argu-
ment places [of non-localised modal operators] must always be filled by an entire sentence […] the 
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non-localised one, just like essence is prior and more fundamental than necessity 
according to Fine (1994); attempts at reducing dispositions to counterfactuals 
fail in part because they get the order of the explanation wrong. Indeed, the Po-
tentiality Theory and Essentialism are very similar – the main difference being 
that the former is a “possibility-first” and the latter a “necessity-first” theory of 
localised modality.4 The hope is that the unavoidable realism about dispositions 
and potentialities might lead to ontological parsimony elsewhere. 
And indeed, one of the main features of Potentiality Theory (as well as Es-
sentialism) is that both aim to be what contessa (2008) has dubbed “Hardcore 
Actualist” theories, that is, to reject the idea that possible worlds (however 
conceived) should play a role in making modal statements true – in short, they 
reject the idea that the Leibnizian biconditionals are metaphysically informa-
tive, as it were. one of the purported advantages of this approach is that we 
need not be committed to strange and controversial entities such as possible 
worlds, since they play no role in fixing the modal truths. This is often taken 
to be a gain both in ontological parsimony and common sense; the Potentiality 
theorist offers the prospect of making sense of modality with a lightweight, 
safe and sane ontology: all we need are powerful actual objects. If we are to 
take the label ‘Actualism’ seriously, we should then think that Potentiality The-
ory is committed to the “being constraint” (Williamson (2013: 148)5 which is 
best expressed by the generalisation (that is, including higher-order variables) 
of the following two theses: 
1. □∀x □(Fx → ∃z x=z) 
2. □∀x□∀y □(Rxy → (∃z x=z ∧ ∃z y=z)
In English, (1) says that necessarily, for all x, necessarily if x has a property 
F, then x is something. (2) says that necessarily, for all x, and necessarily for 
all y, necessarily if x stands in a relation R to y, then x is something and y is 
something.
The third noteworthy feature of Potentiality Theory is that it promises a 
naturalistic account of modality. This point is somewhat implicit in the com-
operators for localised modalities, on the other hand, must have at least one argument for the object 
(or objects) to which the modality belongs, and another argument place for that which is intuitively 
the content of the modality, and which is most naturally expressed by a predicate” (Vetter 2015: 5).
 4 These terms are usually used to refer to different approaches to the epistemology of modality; 
here we employ them in a metaphysical sense: for the potentiality theorist, the fundamental phenom-
ena are what make possibility statements true, and necessity is to be obtained from there. It is tempt-
ing, but not necessary, to think that the epistemology would be isomorphic. 
 5 As Williamson notes, the being constraint can be seen to capture what Plantinga (1983: 11) 
meant by “Serious Actualism”. 
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mitment to Hardcore Actualism, and often the two are run together, but we 
think they contribute to the development of Vetter’s theory in different re-
spects and can pull it in different directions, and so are best kept apart. In 
expounding the appeal of a localised theory of modality, Vetter mentions that 
such an account promises to provide an account of possibility and necessity 
that anchors them to 
just the ordinary objects of this, the actual, world, with which we are in regular 
epistemic contact […] if it succeeds then it does so by anchoring possibilities in realis-
tically respectable bits of the world, ordinary concrete objects. (Vetter 2015: 11) 
The “respectability” of Potentiality Theory can be attributed to two main 
factors: on the one hand, its vindication of a familiar and commonsensical Ar-
istotelian ontology of objects and properties, and on the other hand, the fact 
that such objects are epistemically accessible: “actual objects, with which we 
have epistemic contact” (Vetter 2015: 11). Note: it is not only the fact that such 
objects are actual that makes them “respectable” and accessible: it is also the 
fact that they are concrete – spatiotemporally, and hence causally, linked to us. 
In order to learn about modality we can use a “powerful telescope” (Kripke 
1980: 44), after all! We think that this is sufficient evidence to attribute to 
Potentiality Theory a commitment to ontological Naturalism, which can be 
characterised as “the doctrine that reality consists of nothing but a single all-
embracing spatio-temporal system” (Armstrong 1981: 149). 
2. Unmanifested potentiality and the fundamental puzzle
As we have seen, Vetter’s theory of modality aims to be both hardcore actual-
ist and naturalistic: modality is ultimately a matter of how concrete objects are. 
Whilst we agree that a strongly naturalistic actualism is desirable, we are (with 
regret) doubtful that naturalism can provide enough ontological resources for 
a coherent metaphysical account of irreducible potentialities. our aim in this 
section is to articulate those doubts and to conclude that a Platonic approach 
to potentialities (or something like it) provides the ontological resources that 
we need. As far as we can tell, a move to Platonism about properties would 
accommodate many of the details of Vetter’s potentiality-based account, and it 
can still be considered as an actualist theory. Moreover, as we shall see in the 
next section, Platonism allows us to ground more possibilities than Vetter can 
allow, and therefore overcomes some of the objections facing her theory and 
displays superior theoretical virtues. 
Vetter’s potentiality theory of modality is to be considered naturalistic, in 
part, because it goes hand-in-hand with a broadly Aristotelian approach to 
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properties. on this view, properties (or ‘universals’) do not exist independently 
of their concrete instantiations – of how concrete things are. Unlike the Pla-
tonists, Aristotelians do not have to say that properties exist outside of space 
and time. Rather, Aristotelian universals exist entirely through the concrete 
things that instantiate them, in rebus. The dependence of Aristotelian univer-
sals on their instantiations is typically captured by what Armstrong calls the 
‘Principle of Instantiation’, which for each property 
Demand[s] that it is a property of some particular[, and f]or each relation universal 
[it must] be the case that there are particulars between which the relation holds. (Arm-
strong 1989: 75, quoted in Vetter 2015: 271)
The ontological dependence of Aristotelian universals on their instantiations 
is fairly weak in the sense that it is generic: in order to exist, a property must be a 
property of some particular, but it doesn’t matter which particular performs the 
job. Nonetheless, the dependence of properties on their concrete instantiations 
is strong enough to rule out the existence of type-uninstantiated properties, 
given that such properties are not properties of anything concrete whatsoever.
The problem presented in this section can be summarised as follows: if 
we do not have uninstantiated properties in our armoury, then it is difficult 
to make metaphysical sense of potentialities whose manifestations are never 
manifested or actualised. We will first illustrate the difficulty, and show how 
forever unmanifested properties are problematic for the Aristotelian concep-
tion of universals. We will then show that Vetter’s amended account does not 
succeed in solving the problem while retaining its commitment to naturalism, 
and is therefore in no better position than Platonism in this regard. We finally 
argue that Platonism offers a number of theoretical advantages, and should 
therefore be preferred to an immanentist conception of properties.
2.1. Directedness Platitude
Versions of problem we now turn to have been discussed previously (Arm-
strong 1997; Molnar 2003; bird 2006; Tugby 2013) and are acknowledged by 
Vetter herself (2015: Sect. 7.5). In our view, the problem is best described as a 
tension between the following two platitudes.6 on the one hand, potentialities 
are (partially) individuated by their manifestation types: the identity of a po-
 6 We adopt the term ‘platitude’ in order to be terminologically consistent with Tugby (2013). by it, 
we mean that both ‘platitudes’ express what we take to be central, and in our view non-negotiable, fea-
tures of powers metaphysics. of course, defenders of certain versions of the Powerful qualities view 
could reject DP, and therefore deem the term ‘platitude’ to be unwarranted. Thanks to an anonymous 
referee for highlighting this.
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tentiality is determined by what it is a potentiality for. In order to explain what 
mass is, one can do nothing more than to say that massy objects are disposed 
to exert gravitational force on one another.7 And to explain what something is, 
is precisely to show what individuates it. This point is often expressed by say-
ing that dispositions are essentially “directed” towards certain manifestations 
rather than others. Tugby (2012: 168) dubs this the ‘Directedness Platitude’: 
DP: Dispositions are directed towards their manifestation properties and it is in 
virtue of this directedness that the identity of a disposition is fixed.
To be clear, we are talking about individuation in the metaphysical sense 
rather than, say, the cognitive sense. cognitive individuation is a mind-depen-
dent act that involves singling out an entity in thought. Although it is true that 
we cognitively individuate dispositions by thinking about the manifestations 
that they are dispositions for, this is not the kind of individuation that is at is-
sue above. Even if minded creatures were not to exist, it would still be the case 
that the nature of a disposition is determined by the type of manifestation that 
it is a disposition for. Thus, in speaking of the individuation of dispositions, we 
are speaking of a mind-independent metaphysical determination relation that 
distinguishes a given dispositional property from all other possible disposi-
tional properties. As Lowe puts it, metaphysical individuation is “the relation 
that obtains between entities x and y when x determines or ‘fixes’ (or at least 
helps to determine or ‘fix’) which entity of its kind y is” (2010: 9). 
by stating that the identity of powers is partially determined by what they 
are for, we do not wish to be committed to the idea that the nature of a dispo-
sitional property has to be exhausted by what it is for, or its manifestation rela-
tion (as in Mumford 2004). other factors, such as its stimulus conditions (bird 
2007) or its reciprocal disposition partners, or even its degree and granularity 
(Vetter 2015), may play a prominent role. 
It is less clear whether proponents of a ‘Powerful qualities’ view of powers 
can subscribe to the Directedness Platitude. The core idea of such a view is 
that dispositional properties are both powers and qualities; they are both cat-
egorical and dispositional. There are two crucial issues to be settled before we 
can understand whether DP also applies to Powerful qualities: 
1. How to characterise what are qualities, or categorical properties
2. How to characterise the relation between the powerful and 
 the qualitative aspect 
 7 We assume here that mass is a fundamental property which cannot be further reduced nor 
analysed.
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The crucial point in assessing whether DP applies also to Powerful quali-
ties views concerns how qualities are characterised. For instance, according to 
bird (2016) the difference between a power and a categorical property lies in 
the fact that the former has its modal profile fixed, whereas the latter is ‘mod-
ally variable’. This is due to the fact that “a power is an ontic property a) that 
has a dispositional essence”, and b) “[…] whose identity is given by its causal/
dispositional/nomic role” (bird 2016: 347). Presumably this would mean that a 
categorical property does not have its identity given by its causal/dispositional/
nomic role. That is, DP applies to powers and not to categorical properties. If 
the Powerful qualities view states that powers are also categorical, this would 
mean that Powerful qualities also have a primitive identity: presumably, then, 
DP would not apply to them. 
but if we accept bird’s characterisation of the difference, and if we take the 
relation between powerful and qualitative aspects to be identity (Heil 2003; 
arguably, Martin 2009) then it would follow that Powerful qualities views are 
trivially false: the very same property would have both a fixed and variable 
modal profile, and its identity would be both primitive and fixed by its nomic 
role. obviously, this cannot be the characterisation of the distinction adopted 
by the proponents of the view. 
Taylor (2013: 93-94), on the other hand, elucidates the difference thus: “a 
dispositional property is any property to which it is essential that it conveys 
upon the object that instantiates it the power to behave in a certain way given 
certain stimuli”, whereas “qualitative/categorical properties essentially con-
tribute to the overall makeup of how an object is now”. This characterisation 
does not impinge on differences on identity conditions, and obviously does not 
immediately lead to contradiction when paired with Identity Theory. Nothing 
in the characterisation of categorical properties entails that their identities are 
primitive, and that DP should not apply to them. 
Similarly, Heil (2012: 59) seems to suggest that the defining feature of cat-
egorical properties is just that they are actual or occurrent: “qualities are here 
and now, actual, not merely potential, features of the objects of which they are 
qualities”, and Strawson even equates ‘categorical’ with ‘being’: “all being is 
categorical being because that’s what it is to be! That’s what being is!” (Straw-
son 2008: 278). Again, this understanding of categorical is neutral about the 
identity conditions of qualities, and so does not entail that DP does not apply. 
obviously, there are many versions of the Powerful qualities view, articu-
lated inter alios by Martin (1997; 2009), Heil (2003), Jacobs (2011), Ingthorsson 
(2013; 2015), Taylor (2013; 2018) Giannotti (forthcoming), and contessa (forth-
coming). These authors often differ over the details of the answers offered to i) 
and ii), and so a satisfying answer could be given only after a detailed examina-
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tion. Such a project unfortunately goes beyond the scope of this paper. Perhaps 
not all of these versions are compatible with DP. If it is shown that a Powerful 
quality theory which relies on the elucidation of the categorical/dispositional 
property distinction as involving a radically different theory of individuation 
is viable and preferable to the other Powerful qualities views,8 then this will 
be a serious competitor to our theory below, and more work will have to be 
devoted to establish which theory has the upper hand. For the time being, we 
have shown that the Directedness Platitude is compatible with at least some 
versions of the Powerful qualities view. So, our argument concerns at least a 
considerable portion of the theories of powers on the market, including Vet-
ter’s own theory which we discuss below. 
2.2. central Platitude 
on the other hand, in Tugby’s 2013, it is argued that a desideratum for any 
metaphysics of potentiality (or “dispositionalism”9) is that it accommodates 
what Molar (2003) referred to as “Independence”, and what Tugby (2013) 
called the “central Platitude”:
CP: A particular can have a disposition even if it never manifests that disposition 
(2013: 454). 
We take it that this platitude is part and parcel of any realist approach to 
dispositions. To say that a disposition is a real property of things is precisely 
to say that it can be instantiated even if it is not being exercised. Although 
the manifestation of a disposition is dependent on certain situations obtaining, 
such as a soluble object being placed in water, the disposition itself (e.g. water-
solubility) is not itself dependent on such situations arising. If we are realists 
about dispositions, then we should surely accept that a piece of salt is water-
soluble even if the salt (or any other substance) never finds itself in water. Even 
if salt’s water-solubility is never actually manifested, the disposition still makes 
a counterfactual difference to the world: the disposition is ascribable precisely 
because salt can dissolve even if it doesn’t actually dissolve.
Here is the tension between the platitudes: Per DP and the being con-
straint, if a potentiality is directed to its manifestation, then the manifestation 
 8 Possibly on the basis that it would offer a solution to the regress of pure powers discussed inter 
alios by Lowe (2010), bird (2007), Ingthorsson (2015). However, this might not be so easy: Taylor 
(2018) has argued that an Identity Theory of Powerful qualities is not better off than a pure powers 
view in this respect. 
 9 In what follows we shall use the terms ‘dispositions’ and ‘potentiality’ interchangeably. As men-
tioned earlier, Vetter’s notion of potentiality is broader than the notion of a disposition, but this dif-
ference is not important for the purposes of the following arguments. 
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exists. but, per CP, the manifestation needs not occur. Armstrong (1997: 78) 
concluded that dispositions either give raise to a contradiction, or are com-
mitted to a “Meinongian” ontology, where dispositions are somehow related 
to the non-existent. Given the commitment to Hardcore Actualism, both re-
sults would be equally unwelcome. Fortunately for the friends of potentialities, 
Armstrong’s argument is too quick and is based on an ambiguous reading of 
‘manifestation’. ‘Manifestation’ can stand both for the second relatum of di-
rectedness (what a potentiality is for) and for its obtaining – the fact that the 
potentiality has been successfully exercised, and brought the concrete manifes-
tation about. A contradiction arises only if we read ‘manifestation’ in both CP 
and DP as referring to the existence of what the power is for, thus reading CP 
as stating that the object the disposition is for can fail to exist. 
but there is no reason to read CP as concerning the existence of the manifes-
tation, understood as what a disposition is for. What CP maintains is that such 
manifestation can fail to occur, or to be brought about: the manifestation (ob-
ject) can fail to be manifested (be brought about). This suggests the following 
schema to escape the problem: 
1. ♢ F(P) ∧ ¬ F(M)   (central Platitude)
2. Directed (P, M)   (Directedness Platitude)
3. ∃X (X=M)   (2., being constraint) 
4. ♢∃X (X=M ∧¬F(M)) (1,3) 
The platitudes generate a contradiction only if F is taken to be ‘existence’, 
and results in possibilism (i.e., the existence of non-actual entities) only if F 
is taken to be ‘actual’.10 but there is no reason to do so: there is a variety of 
other relevant properties that F could be.11 In particular, it was suggested by 
Mumford (2004: ch. 11) that F could be ‘instantiation’, and that the manifesta-
tion could be a universal: in this case CP would just state that the disposition 
could fail to bring about the instantiation of the universal on some particular 
occasion, while its identity is fixed by the universal, as per DP. This solution 
preserves Hardcore Actualism (for it accepts the being constraint and admits 
only actual objects, such as universals) and, in so far as the universals in ques-
tion are Aristotelian (spatiotemporally located), Naturalism. We take it that 
 10 See bird (2006, 2007). 
 11 For instance, one could in principle characterise F to be ‘concreteness’ (or something like that), 
claiming that unmanifested manifestations display a kind of “purely logical existence” (Williamson 
2002); one of us favours a solution along those lines. For the purposes of this paper, however, we will 
assume that ‘instantiation’ is the best way to articulate the proposal, and only consider universals as 
manifestations. 
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Vetter (2015: ch. 7) adopts universals as manifestations for potentialities pre-
cisely in order to avail herself of Mumford’s strategy to solve the tension and 
maintain a commitment to both Hardcore Actualism and Naturalism while 
retaining DP.
The problem for this approach is that the central Platitude also establishes 
that all instances of a potentiality property could go unmanifested: it is pos-
sible that the Aristotelian manifestation universal is never instantiated, and 
therefore does not exist. This can easily be shown: either there is something 
special about the unmanifesting instances, or there is not. If there is not, then 
one has to admit that any instance (token) of non-maximal potentiality could 
fail to bring about its manifestation. but if this were the case, surely it could be 
the case that all instances of potentialities happen to fail to bring about their 
manifestations: since the unmanifesting instance was arbitrary, we can’t block 
the universal generalisation: if F is true of an arbitrary x of the domain, then 
∀xFx. So, whole potentiality types can fail to manifest. 
The other option is to say that there is something special about certain 
instances. Let’s call this distinguishing feature ‘K’, and maintain that only a 
subset of the token potentialities happen to have it. Then it would seem that 
Token-Independence (to adopt the terminology of Molnar 2003) is not a fea-
ture of potentialities per se, but rather of K: K is the difference-maker and hence 
CP applies only to K-potentialities. but this clashes with the central Platitude, 
which was supposed to be a principle of dispositions qua dispositions.
Vetter (2015: 85-94) allows potentialities of maximal degree that necessarily 
bring about their manifestations, and hence will reject the idea that the central 
Platitude obtains in virtue of the nature of potentialities qua potentialities – 
rather, she will maintain that CP holds in virtue of the degree of a potentiality. 
Still, the problem remains, although on a slightly more limited scale: even if 
we think that CP does not hold for all potentialities, it will hold for all the non-
maximal potentialities, which can be Type-Independent.
call the universals that are never manifested ‘aliens’, and potentialities 
that are directed to them ‘alien potentialities’. Given that Aristotelian uni-
versals ontologically depend on their instantiation, if they are never instanti-
ated they do not exist. This leaves us unable to adopt Mumford’s solution 
in the case of aliens. We are then left with what we call the alien puzzle of 
potentiality: how are alien potentialities individuated? It is difficult to see 
how this puzzle can be solved without renouncing Hardcore Actualism, or 
renouncing Naturalism.
one could salvage Naturalism and Aristotelian universals by denying the 
validity of the derivation from 2. to 3. This is the move that the defenders of 
“physical intentionality” make (e.g. Molnar 2003). but that would mean violat-
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ing the being constraint and hence force Vetter to abandon her commitment 
to Hardcore Actualism. We take it that Vetter would find this solution to be 
highly undesirable, and we wholeheartedly agree.12
Alternatively, one could renounce (ontological) Naturalism and adopt Pla-
tonic Universals: since these do not depend upon their instantiations for their 
existence, it is perfectly acceptable to think that there are uninstantiated (alien) 
universals – no modification of the account would be required to make sense 
of alien potentialities. but Vetter seems to think that this would be an unac-
ceptable loss: Naturalism plays an important part in making the ontology of 
Potentiality Theory “respectable”, because 
the picture of metaphysical modality that I am offering derives its attraction, I be-
lieve, not merely from the fact that it thereby locates modality in properties, viz. poten-
tialities, but also from the fact that it thereby locates modality in objects of the ordinary 
kind: concrete objects. (Vetter 2015: 270)
So Vetter finds herself in the uneasy situation of accepting the force of the 
fundamental puzzle for the Aristotelian potentiality theorist (2015: 271), with-
out being willing to give up either Actualism or Naturalism. In order to rec-
oncile Actualism with Naturalism, Vetter proposes to modify the Principle of 
Instantiation discussed earlier in a way that can ground talk of unmanifested 
properties within an Aristotelian framework. The modified principle, called 
the ‘Principle of Potential Instantiation’ (PPI) is as follows:
PPI: Every universal must be at least potentially instantiated: there is a property 
universal of being F only if there is some particular thing which is F, is potentially F, 
or is potentially such that something is F; there is a relation universal of R-ing only if 
there are some particular things which R, or which potentially R, or which are poten-
tially such that some things R. (Vetter 2015: 272)
Vetter then explains how this modified principle of instantiation gets around 
the problem of unmanifested dispositions: 
… the claim that something has a potentiality to have (or produce or constitute 
something which has) the actually uninstantiated property of being F is not in jeop-
 12 Note that it is not wholly clear that such a move would preserve Naturalism, either: it is far from 
clear what it means for a physical state to be directed towards something that does not exist. In the 
mental case, we can at least say that the non-existent intentional objects are represented and that those 
representations serve to individuate different mental states. but since Molnar (2003) maintains that 
physical intentional states do not represent, it is not obvious how such intentional states are individu-
ated; the risk is that physical intentionality de facto makes the individuation of potentialities a primi-
tive, undetectable fact. but this would violate DP, as well as make them epistemically inaccessible. 
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ardy because there might be no property of being F. Rather, that claim, if true, guar-
antees that there is such a property, because this is precisely what it takes for there to 
be a property of being F. (2015: 272).
This is a striking quotation because on a natural reading of this proposed 
solution, ontological naturalism seems to be under threat. both PPI and the 
application of it employs existential quantification: it is said there is a property 
universal only if there is some particular thing which is F, is potentially F, or is 
potentially such that something is F. crucially, in cases where something is po-
tentially F, but nothing ever manifests that potentiality, then F surely remains 
uninstantiated. Hence, on a natural reading of this principle, it commits us to 
the existence of uninstantiated properties. The approach remains Aristotelian, 
in so far as it maintains that universals depend on concrete entities for their ex-
istence: not only their instances, but also the potentialities that are directed at 
them. The problem is that, it seems to us, such Aristotelianism is no longer nat-
uralistic. It was not the fact that properties are dependent upon something that 
made them naturalistically kosher, but rather the fact that they were located in 
space-time: they were located where their instances were. but now consider the 
uninstantiated Aristotelian universals allowed by PPI: where in space-time are 
they? Surely they are not located where their instances are, because there are 
none. but they cannot be located where the potentialities directed to them are, 
either, because i) nothing grants that the manifestation is co-located with the 
potentiality, and ii) if they were located there, then by Aristotelian lights they 
would surely be instantiated by the bearers of the potentiality, which would 
catastrophically mean that every power is always already manifested. 
If the Aristotelian universals allowed by PPI are not located in space-time, 
then a theory invoking them is not compatible with Naturalism as we under-
stand it. but if this is the case, it is no longer clear how Vetter’s approach differs 
from Platonism. We take the allowance of properties which are not instantiated 
to be the core commitment of Platonism and one that is inconsistent with the on-
tologically naturalistic commitment to locating all entities in space and time. Vet-
ter’s position seems dangerously (or, we think, fortunately) close to Platonism.
Later on Vetter distances herself from Platonism by associating Platonism 
with the view that there are super-alien properties, where super-alien proper-
ties are properties that “no actual thing ever had a potentiality to have, to 
produce, or to constitute” (2015: 69). However, we do not see why all Platonists 
have to accept the existence of super-alien properties. As we shall see in sec-
tion 3, we think there are good reasons for accepting that there are super-alien 
properties. Nonetheless, a version of Platonism which follows Armstrong’s “a 
posteriori realism” about universals (1978), and uses science as guide as to what 
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(non-super) alien properties there are, is perfectly coherent. Again, we take the 
core commitment of Platonism to be that properties do not need to be instan-
tiated in order to exist. Whether or not there are super-alien properties is a 
matter for in-house dispute between Platonists. 
We can think of a couple of interpretations of the Principle of Potential 
Instantiation that avoid Platonism, as we understand it, but neither of them is 
appealing. First, it could be said that the existential quantifier employed in the 
PPI does not entail an ontological commitment to uninstantiated properties. 
This move would require us to distinguish between so called “quantifier com-
mitment” and “ontological commitment” (see e.g. Azzouni 2004). However, 
the problem with this approach is that it is precisely the sort of move that is 
employed by some Meinongians, as a way of denying an ontological commit-
ment to non-existent objects (see e.g. Priest 2005). Hence, this approach to un-
instantiated manifestations would arguably place Vetter in the category of Mei-
nongian dispositionalists. We agree with Armstrong that this is best avoided. 
However, there is another option. Recall that the difference between Vet-
ter’s position and Platonism lies in the fact that Aristotelian universals are not 
ontological independent, whereas Platonic universals are. So, perhaps a more 
promising way for Vetter to avoid ontological commitment to uninstantiated 
properties is to say that unmanifested properties exist in the sense that they are 
grounded in the potentialities of things. This option is open to Vetter because 
she independently accepts that grounding is an important relation (2015: 26-
28).13 Grounding is a metaphysical determination relation that provides an ex-
planation for why something is so (see e.g. Schaffer 2009 and Rosen 2010). Im-
portantly, grounded entities can be thought to be derivative and “ontological 
free lunches”, given that their being is fully explained by their grounds. one 
could think that the only ontological commitment that really matters concerns 
only fundamentalia. Hence, if uninstantiated manifestations were grounded in 
the relevant potentialities, quantifying over them would involve no increase in 
genuine ontological commitment. We would not have to say that uninstanti-
ated manifestations exist over and above the instantiated potentialities, and 
therefore a full-blown Platonic commitment to uninstantiated manifestations 
would be avoided. We suspect that a view along these lines may be what Vetter 
ultimately has in mind. 
 13 Note that it is far from obvious that Potentiality Theory is in the end compatible with ground-
ing. Grounding is typically thought to be a modally-laded notion. For instance, the orthodox (e.g. 
deRosset 2010; Fine 2015) view of grounding is that if Γ (fully) grounds Β, then it is metaphysically 
necessary that Β exists if Γ does. It is not clear that Potentiality Theory can explain such modal con-
sequences in a plausible way. For the sake of argument, we will not press this point and assume that 
the use of grounding is compatible with Potentiality Theory.
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Unfortunately we think that this line of defence faces some thorny prob-
lems. The most serious difficultly concerns the original difficulty of individu-
ating potentialities that are unmanifested. As we have seen, potentialities are 
plausibly individuated by their manifestation properties. If those manifestation 
properties are ontological free lunches, then we have a problem: for it is dif-
ficult to see how something that is not an ontological free lunch can be indi-
viduated by something that is itself an ontological free lunch (see e.g. barker 
2009: 247 and Tugby 2016: sect. 3.1 for related points). It seems incoherent 
to suppose that potentialities, which are ontologically fundamental, could be 
individuated by something less fundamental than themselves and which they 
themselves ground. To think otherwise is to violate the metaphysical analogue 
of what Sider calls the ‘principle of purity’ (2011: 106), which says that “funda-
mental truths involve only fundamental notions” (see also Jaag 2014: sect. 3 for 
a closely related discussion of purity in the context of dispositionalism).
To sum up this section, we have argued that Vetter’s attempt to solve the 
fundamental puzzle of potentialities either fails, or she ends up precisely with a 
sort of ontologically non-naturalistic approach to properties that is close to Pla-
tonism. The choice between Aristotelian and Platonic universals is, of course, 
a metaphysical matter, and should be settled in the canonical way: weighing 
costs and benefits of the overall theory. The difference between a Platonist 
position and Vetter’s PPI boils down to this: 
platonism: Potentialities depend upon their manifestations (universals) for their 
identity. These universals can exist uninstantiated and do not depend upon concrete 
potentialities for their existence.
Vetter’s aristotelianism: Potentialities depend upon their manifestations (univer-
sals) for their identity. These universals, in turn, depend for their existence upon their 
actual instantiations or the concrete potentialities for their instantiation.
one of the canonical advantages of Aristotelian universals over Platonic 
ones was that it did not need to commit to non-spatiotemporally located enti-
ties and thus did not violate ontological naturalism. Vetter’s theory cannot, we 
have argued, enjoy such a benefit. While this does not amount to a knock-down 
argument against Vetter’s position, we struggle to see what other good reasons 
there are to retain the commitment to PPI. Here’s one hypothesis: Vetter (2015: 
270) does not wish to attribute potentialities to Platonic universals (e.g. the 
potentiality to be instantiated), because “the picture of metaphysical modality 
that I am offering derives its attraction […] from the fact that it locates modal-
ity in properties, viz. potentialities, but also from the fact that it thereby locates 
modality in objects of the ordinary kind: concrete objects” (2015: 270). Perhaps 
Vetter is worried that, were one to adopt Platonic universals, she would be 
 PoTENTIALITy: AcTUALISM MINUS NATURALISM EqUALS PLAToNISM 131
drawn to attributing potentialities to them, rather than concrete objects. Note 
that the problem with this move is not that of attributing potentialities to ab-
stract entities (since she attributes them to numbers: see Vetter 2015: 279-80) 
but rather that it tempts us into a ‘catch-all solution’, in which all we need to 
ground modal truths are the potentialities to be instantiated of all the univer-
sals. We think that the Platonist can resist such temptation just as well as the 
Aristotelian does. The point is orthogonal to the dependency of universals: it 
concerns the bearers of potentialities, not what potential properties are or what 
they depend upon. The Platonist is free to maintain that potentialities can only 
be instantiated by concrete objects, and yet the properties they are directed to-
ward are metaphysically independent. conversely, a proponent of Aristotelian 
universals is free to think that universals can be the bearers of potentialities: 
potentialities are had by non-fundamental entities, too. 
More interestingly, resisting the ‘catch-all’ strategy does not mean that we 
can never attribute potentialities to universals – we think that it is open to the 
Platonist who accepts super-aliens to do so, in order to ground certain scien-
tifically interesting truths. More precisely, we will try to show in the following 
section that Platonism is able to elegantly accommodate scientific possibilities 
involving so-called super-alien scenarios. In contrast, these are possibilities 
that Vetter’s metaphysical framework struggles to accommodate. To reiterate: 
Platonists need not be committed to super-aliens, but we believe that such a 
commitment is highly beneficial to our understanding of scientific practice. 
In short, we think there are reasons to prefer a metaphysical outlook that is 
compatible with the possibility of super-aliens. 
3. Platonism, idealisation, and scientific possibility 
In the previous section we saw how Platonism is generally regarded as a 
non-naturalistic position, given that it allows entities which need not have con-
crete being. However, we do not think it follows that the theory of Platonism 
is divorced from science. Indeed, we think that certain kinds of scientific theo-
rising may lend support to Platonism. For example, for various reasons sci-
entists often reason about scenarios that involve what Vetter would regard as 
‘super-alien’ properties, as defined above. If there are truths about which su-
per-alien scenarios are and are not possible, then it is natural to enquire about 
the truthmakers for such claims. Here, the Platonists have a straightforward 
truthmaking story to tell: truths about super-alien possibilities are grounded 
in the modal profiles of uninstantiated properties. As we shall see, Vetter does 
not have the metaphysical resources to provide truthmakers for super-alien 
possibilities, which by her own admission leads her to deny that there are any 
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super-alien possibilities (2015: 270). Hence, if we accept Vetter’s naturalistic 
framework, we can no longer take scientific talk of such possibilities at face 
value, which, as we shall see, leads to a disunified picture of scientific discourse 
about alien possibilities. We believe that this is a serious cost of Vetter’s theory. 
To be clear, we do not think that, by itself, this problem is fatal. However, once 
the arguments of the previous section are also taken into consideration, the 
case for Platonism begins to look strong.
Why then does Vetter’s potentiality-based theory of modality present a dis-
unified picture of alien possibility? on the one hand, in cases where scientists 
theorise about possibilities concerning uninstantiated properties that some 
concrete thing has the potentiality to have (or produce), Vetter is happy to say 
that there are truths about such possibilities and that the relevant potentialities 
are the truthmakers. Indeed, science is awash with such truths, as exemplified 
by the Journal of Computer-Aided Molecular Design.14 but on the other hand, in 
the case of alleged truths about super-alien possibilities – alleged possibilities 
that no concrete thing has the potentiality to realize – Vetter has to deny that 
there are any such truths, metaphysically speaking. Since, by definition, such 
possibilities are not tied to potentialities that some concrete thing has, Vetter 
has to deny that there are such possibilities after all. Super-alien possibilities 
might be assertible in the sense that they are epistemically possible, or true in 
some fictional sense, but strictly speaking no claims about the metaphysical 
possibility of super-alien properties can be (non-vacuously) true, since there 
is nothing in Vetter’s framework that can serve as truthmaker. To be fair to 
Vetter, she accepts that this is a bullet she has to bite (2015: 269). However, 
we think that this is a more serious problem than Vetter acknowledges. Talk 
of super-alien possibilities is widespread in science. Moreover, as we shall see, 
some of the accepted laws of nature plausibly concern how idealised systems 
would behave in various circumstances and in many cases there are reasons for 
thinking that such systems are not physically realizable by anything. Hence, it 
seems that these laws – which are posited in science for various explanatory 
purposes – concern metaphysical possibilities that are super-alien on Vetter’s 
definition. Given that we think laws of nature should be taken metaphysically 
seriously, we believe that super-alien possibilities should be too. 
What then are examples of scientific claims about super-alien possibilities, 
and why do scientists think that these possibilities are important? Super-alien 
possibilities are typically expressed using what philosophers call counternomic 
or counterlegal conditionals. These are counterfactuals whose antecedents de-
scribe a scenario that is not possible in physical worlds like ours. The counter-
 14 We learnt about this journal from James Franklin (2015).
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nomics that are of most interest in science involve idealisations. In such cases, 
the antecedent describes a scenario that is similar in some respects to a phe-
nomenon that we are interested in in the real world, but which differs in other 
ways. In other words, such a description is an inaccurate representation of the 
real world phenomenon that we are interested in. It is inaccurate in the sense 
that it ignores certain properties that the real world system has or attributes 
properties that the real system does not have (see Psillos 2011: 7). Why then are 
counternomics useful in science, if they do not accurately represent scenarios 
in the real world? The answer is that idealisations help us to reason about the 
causal contributions made by specific properties of a system – contributions 
that are described in the consequent of the counternomic claim. Idealisations 
are “simplifying distortions” (Teller, 2012: 272), which make “immensely dif-
ficult physical problems computationally tractable and calculable to close ap-
proximations of their actual values” (Tan 2019: 44). If we want to investigate 
the relationship between, say, the length and trajectory of a natural pendulum, 
it seems we have no choice but to consider how a pendulum would behave in 
the absence of other causally relevant factors such as the mass of the pendulum 
string and air resistance. but since massless pendulum strings are not nomi-
cally possible, such reasoning inevitably rests upon counternomic claims.
other examples of counternomic idealisations in science abound. classi-
cal mechanics provides a rich stock of examples in the literature on counter-
nomics, such as frictionless planes, point mass planets, ideal gases, models of 
projectile motion and so on. It is also plausible that modern theories in fun-
damental physics are heavily idealised. For example, “the quanta of quantum 
field theory are an artifact of describing space-time as flat” (Teller 2012: 269) 
and in physical theory “the velocity of light is the constant c (which of course 
we do not know precisely) – but only in a vacuum, and there are no perfect 
vacua” (Teller 2012: 263).
In any case, what is important for our purposes is that i) counternomic rea-
soning is employed in at least some areas of natural science, ii) many such coun-
ternomics describe properties that are super-alien in the sense defined earlier, 
and iii) some counternomic claims are true in a non-vacuous, metaphysically 
serious sense. We do not think that ii) is difficult to establish. It seems clear 
that nothing in our physical world has or will have the potentiality to instanti-
ate or produce a frictionless plane, a massless piece of string, perfect vacua and 
so on. For example, in order for something to have the potentiality to produce 
a frictionless plane, it would have to be able to violate laws concerning molecu-
lar force. In favour of iii), it is prima facie plausible that there is an important 
difference between vacuously true counterpossible claims, whose antecedent 
describes a logically impossible scenario, and some of the counternomic claims 
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described above. In the case of vacuous counterpossibles, like “if 2+2 were to 
equal 5, then the moon would be made of cheese”, any consequent whatsoever 
follows from the antecedent. but in the cases described above, there is surely 
a substantive right or wrong answer as to what would follow counterfactually 
if, say, my car were travelling on a frictionless plane. The non-vacuity of such 
counterfactuals becomes even more clear when we note that many idealised 
counterfactuals are used to capture facts about the actual laws of nature are in 
our world. brian Ellis (1987: 54) has discussed a number of such examples. For 
instance, the principles of special relativity tell us how things would behave 
in inertial systems, though general relativity implies that nothing actually has 
the potential to physically realize such systems. The laws of thermodynamics 
provide other examples. Some of them describe how perfectly reversible heat 
engines would behave, even though other thermodynamic principles rule out 
the physical possibility of anything constituting or producing such engines. In 
short, if there are no super-alien possibilities, metaphysically speaking, then the 
metaphysical status of even scientifically supported laws of nature is brought 
into question. Assuming, then, that many counternomics in science are true in 
a non-vacuous, substantive way, it is natural to enquire about their truthmak-
ers. The Platonist potentiality theorist has a ready-made answer: these coun-
ternomics are made true by the super-alien properties involved, such as being 
a frictionless plane or being a Carnot engine, which have a dispositional essence 
but which remain uninstantiated in our physical world. 
What, then, is the problem for Vetter? As we saw earlier, Vetter does not have 
the metaphysical resources to provide truthmakers for counternomic claims, 
because all metaphysical possibilities have to be grounded in the potentialities 
of actual concrete things. Since no concrete thing has the potentiality to instan-
tiate or produce an instantiation of a super-alien property, then there can be no 
such possibilities, metaphysically speaking. This means that scientific talk of 
super-alien possibilities must in some sense be second rate when compared with 
non-super alien possibilities. on Vetter’s theory, non-super alien possibilities 
are in perfectly good standing: claims about them are non-vacuous and meta-
physically substantive. but on Vetter’s theory, as soon as we start thinking about 
super-alien possibilities, we are no longer thinking about genuine possibilities 
and are deceived if we think we are. This leaves us with a disunified account 
of scientific modal discourse, and we think this is a significant cost given the 
ubiquity of super-alien counternomic idealisation in science.
How then could someone like Vetter get around this worry? one option 
would be to accept that counternomics are true, but only in a vacuous sense. 
For reasons given above, we do not think this is a feasible option. Those who 
think otherwise are guilty of not paying close enough attention to examples 
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from science (see Tan 2019 for a detailed argument along these lines). A more 
promising solution would be to accept that our world contains objects with 
what Jenkins and Nolan (2012) call “impossible dispositions”, which are dis-
positions for impossible manifestations (or stimuli). This solution allows some-
one like Vetter to maintain that super-alien manifestations are metaphysically 
impossible and at the same time the impossible dispositions would provide 
substantive truthmakers for the relevant counternomic claims. 
Despite the promise of the impossible dispositions strategy, it is not one that 
Vetter herself endorses. In a discussion of the paper by Jenkins and Nolan, 
Vetter (2015: 250-257) discusses precisely this solution and rejects it. This is 
not surprising, given that the whole point of Vetter’s project is to align possi-
bility with potentiality; impossibilities arise when there is a lack of potentiality 
rather than a potentiality for an impossibility.15 Many of Vetter’s arguments 
against Jenkins and Nolan rely on a rejection of what she calls the “conditional 
conception” of dispositions (2015: ch. 3). We do not have the space to discuss 
the details of Vetter’s arguments but we agree with the conclusion that the 
impossible dispositions approach will not be plausible in many scientific cases. 
To be fair to Jenkins and Nolan, we do not think it is obviously absurd to say 
that an actual car has the disposition to move in a certain way on an inclined 
frictionless plane. However, we agree with Vetter (2015: 256) that in the ex-
ample of the scientific idealisation that Jenkins and Nolan discuss (Jenkins and 
Nolan: 2012: 746), it is implausible to think there as an impossible disposition. 
The case allegedly requires us to say that a rabbit population has the disposi-
tion to increase by 0.1 rabbit per month. but given that these kinds of increases 
are ascribed to actual populations by scientists, surely such ascriptions must 
either be understood in non-literal way or else regarded as false, strictly speak-
ing; in which case the dispositions for such increases can also be treated in a 
similar way (Vetter 2015: 256). consider also the kind of counternomic claim 
discussed by Handfield: “if gravity had obeyed an inverse cube law, the planets 
would have had very different orbits” (2004: 403). We think it is implausible to 
suppose that masses have an impossible disposition to give rise to inverse cube 
gravitational behaviour. In our world, gravity is generated by mass, whose dis-
positional essence concerns inverse square behaviour rather than inverse cube 
behaviour. Moreover, if we are to accept that masses have impossible ‘inverse 
cube’ dispositions, we would surely have to posit an endless number of such 
 15 This is also why Vetter should not appeal to the notion of masked potentialities in order to 
accommodate super-alien possibilities. For example, if we claimed that a heat engine had the potenti-
ality for fully reversible behaviour, but that this potentiality would always be blocked by other prop-
erties of the engine, this would be tantamount to saying that the engine has a nomically impossible 
potentiality. 
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dispositions, with each one corresponding to a different inverse function. For 
these reasons, we believe that a Platonic analysis of Handfield’s counternomic 
conditional is much more plausible. In line with Handfield’s suggestion (2004: 
406), we can interpret the antecedent as describing a case in which ‘schmass’ 
rather than mass in instantiated, where schmass’s dispositional essence is to 
give rise to inverse cube behaviour. According to the Platonic analysis, the 
truthmaker for this counternomic is the property of schmass, which exists in 
an uninstantiated state. To be clear, this does not mean that it is possible that 
gravity obeyed an inverse cube law – only that super-aliens allow us to explain 
why that counternomic is true, as opposed to “if gravity had obeyed an inverse 
cube law, the planets would have had the very same orbits”.
Another non-Platonic option to for someone like Vetter to take seriously 
is to say that although no particular object has the potentiality to produce 
super-alien instantiations, the world as a whole does. Indeed, Vetter discusses 
this strategy and explores whether it could be used as a catch-all solution for 
alleged cases of possibility for which potentialities are not easy to find (2015: 
257-263). 16 As Vetter points out (2015: 261), this general strategy will remind 
some of the explanation of conservation laws given by bigelow, Ellis and Lierse 
(1992), according to which conservation principles are grounded in the dispo-
sitional essence of the ‘world kind’. Vetter is however sceptical of this solution 
and argues convincingly that spelling out the nature of the world-level object 
in the appropriate way is difficult to do (2015: 258-261). We would merely add 
that ascribing potentialities to the world as a whole also leaves us with expla-
nations which arguably suffer from the same problems as those provided by 
bigelow, Ellis and Lierse in the case of conservation laws. As Livanios (2010: 
302) argues, such explanations are either poor ones or deeply ad hoc. Accord-
ing to Livanios such explanations are often poor because they are too coarse 
grained. That is to say, world-level explanations are so general in character that 
they are not informative. Moreover, as Tugby discusses elsewhere (2017: 2071), 
the world – level strategy is suspiciously easy to employ, because it provides 
an automatic recipe for explaining any modal phenomenon that is otherwise 
difficult to explain. Surely doing modal metaphysics should be more difficult 
than this. 
What then are the remaining options for those who accept Vetter’s meta-
physical framework? We think that the least problematic options all involve 
biting the bullet, by conceding that there are no super-alien metaphysical pos-
sibilities. There are at least two ways of doing this. one is to employ a fictional-
ist account of scientific idealisation along the lines Frigg’s theory of scientific 
 16 We are also grateful to Daniel Nolan for raising this possibility during discussion. 
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models (2010). According to such a theory, claims about counternomics are 
not literally true but are true in some weaker sense: true according to scientific 
fiction. The other option is one that Vetter has recently endorsed (2016), which 
involves viewing claims about super-alien possibilities as counterpossibles that 
can be true, but which concern epistemic rather than metaphysical possibility. 
on this account, true counternomic claims are truths about the compatibility 
of a certain counterfactual (or counterpossible) with our knowledge or evi-
dence. claims about the potentialities or dispositions of things are, in contrast, 
metaphysical or “circumstantial” (2016: 2694). Unfortunately, we do not have 
the space to discuss the proposals of Frigg and Vetter in the detail that they 
deserve. We accept that if Platonism is rejected, then the fictionalist and epis-
temic approaches will be strong contenders. However, our point for current 
purposes is that, unlike Platonism, both theories incur the cost of leaving us 
with a disunified treatment of scientific modal discourse. on these theories, 
many scientific modal claims are both literally true and metaphysically serious, 
but as soon as scientists engage in idealised, counternomic modal discourse, 
the claims are either literally false or not metaphysically serious. We cannot 
help feeling that this makes the latter sort of scientific discourse appear second 
rate. Moreover, if people like Teller (2012) are right, and almost all funda-
mental scientific theories are idealised and rest heavily on counternomic as-
sumptions, then we worry that the fictionalist and epistemic approaches strike 
a blow against scientific realism itself. If one wants to take scientific theories 
metaphysically seriously, then Platonism is a very tempting route to take. 
4. Conclusions
We have argued that Vetter cannot accommodate both Hardcore Actual-
ism and Naturalism. We recommend that Vetter loosens her commitment to 
Naturalism and accepts a Platonic theory of potentiality or something like it. 
The Platonic theory provides an elegant solution to the fundamental puzzle of 
potentiality and brings a variety of peripheral modal benefits, especially in the 
context of natural science.
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